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The Riots of December 2008: their Causes 
in Historical and International Contexts
David Close
The riots of December 2008 were initially provoked by the killing of a schoolchild, but 
had wider motives. Most rioters were students or schoolchildren; while the destruction 
was perpetrated mainly by self-styled anarchists and revolutionaries. For the most part, 
their attitudes and behaviour patterns can be dated from 1974 and were now unique to 
Greece. The young were experienced in protesting against a poor educational system, 
lack of job prospects and political corruption. 
anarchists and revolutionaries flourished in a society which had good cause to be 
disrespectful of governmental authority. Both groups confronted a discredited and 
inefficient police force. 
Introduction
For over two weeks before Christmas Day 2008, television screens around the world 
were filled with lurid pictures of large crowds in most Greek cities, attacking riot 
police with rocks and Molotov cocktails, and wrecking shops and banks. in a coun-
try characterised by the frequency of violent demonstrations, these were by far the 
most serious since the establishment of the modern democratic system in 1974. as a 
youth rebellion — because most of the demonstrators were young — this rivalled in 
scale and intensity any that occurred in western europe in the great period of student 
uprisings in the late 1960s. There were sympathetic demonstrations in at least nine 
european capitals, and in several other major european cities. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the causes of these incidents, by placing 
them in historical and international contexts. it will be argued that they were the 
outcome of attitudes and behaviour patterns which, for the most part, dated from 
1974 and were now unique to Greece. 
The killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos
The incident that sparked the riots was so provocative that it would undoubtedly have 
caused an explosion in any western european country at any time in recent history. 
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on the night of 6 December, a police officer, epaminondas Korkoneas, shot dead 
a 15-year-old boy before witnesses in the athens district of exarchia. The circum-
stances — as generally accepted — were as follows (Amnesty International Report, 
p. 6; several reports in Kathimerini). 
The officer had been verbally abused by a group of youths earlier in the even-
ing; and was then ordered by headquarters to leave the area. Disobeying the order, 
he sought out and confronted the group again, whereupon he and a colleague were 
assailed with nothing worse than words. Korkoneas fired a bullet which initially 
ricocheted, but from a point on the ground near the boy. in its provocative nature, a 
parallel was the killing in West Berlin, in June 1967, by a police officer (who turned 
out much later to be an undercover agent of the east German regime) of a peace-
fully demonstrating student, Benno ohnesorg, so beginning a prolonged series in 
West Germany of nation-wide rebellions by university students and terrorist acts 
by revolutionary groups. The previous killing of a youngster by police in Greece, in 
november 1985, had provoked a retaliatory attack a few days later by a terrorist group 
on a police bus, which killed one police officer and seriously wounded three others. 
Korkoneas was a member of the special Guard, a police unit less trained in the 
use of firearms than the rest of the police, and already seen by headquarters as a 
problem (To Vima, 21 December 2008:a16, v. G. lambropoulos; To Vima, 4 January, 
2009:a38, anon.). he had been serving for eight years in exarchia, a Bohemian quar-
ter of athens, which was the favoured haunt of self-styled anarchists who habitually 
abused and attacked the police. so Korkoneas must have endured plenty of provoca-
tion and was probably overdue for a transfer. he saw himself anyway as a tough guy, 
and was clearly the wrong sort of character to be a police officer. an ex-paratrooper, 
he claimed that his family came from Mani, a rocky peninsula whose inhabitants 
were renowned for their pugnacity and authoritarian views (To Vima, 14 December 
2008:a13, eleftheria Kollia). 
The victim, alexis Grigoropoulos, was the son of well-to-do parents and attended 
a select private school. his school principal told a television interviewer later (sBs 
Television, Dateline, 30 June 2009) that he had not been distinguished by wild behav-
iour; nor was it remarkable that someone of his age should abuse police in exarchia. 
The chief of police, the prime minister and the president of the republic quickly 
condemned Korkoneas’ action and expressed sorrow to the victim’s family. Korko-
neas himself was soon arrested and charged with manslaughter. The charge was later 
changed to one of premeditated murder, of which he was eventually found guilty, in 
october 2010, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
These gestures made no noticeable impression on protestors. angry demonstra-
tions started within 90 minutes of the killing. Convened by text messages and the 
internet, the demonstrations continued daily for about two weeks, and then frequently 
for several more days. Most of the demonstrators were schoolchildren or students. a 
quite separate group, which participated in looting, consisted of immigrants, presum-
ably coming from an inner-city ghetto of central athens. as a result of their poverty, 
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complete neglect by the government, and frequent victimisation by the police, many 
had turned to small-scale street crime. There was a growing alignment between them 
and anarchists, in reaction against the xenophobic and militant Golden Dawn (Χρυσή 
Αυγή) movement (Kathimerini, 5 February 2008, Pantelis Boukalas; Kathimerini, 12 
september 2008; Pagoulatos in economides and Monastiriotis: 48). 
other protestors consisted of self-styled anarchists or revolutionaries, of whom 
(according to police), there were 800 active in athens, and 2,200 in other towns 
(although the rounded total of 3,000 makes this precision suspect). The police claimed 
to know who nearly all were, and said that they were drawn from all social strata, and 
had coordinated their activities in the past few years with text messages on mobile 
phones (To Vima, 14 December 2008:a9, v. G. lambropoulos). Mainly because of the 
extremists’ activities, the demonstrations resulted in immense destruction in nearly 
all larger towns. several hundred shops were destroyed; several university premises 
were vandalised; and the library of european law of the university of athens was 
destroyed by fire. around the middle of the month, many hundreds of schools and 
university faculties were occupied by schoolchildren and students. 
During December, the cabinet met daily, but was manifestly helpless. at first, 
it ordered the police to remain passive so as to avoid provocation. in many towns, 
shopkeepers were compelled by police passivity to organise their own defence 
against protestors who travelled between towns by bus. on university campuses, 
the academic authorities preferred to organise their own defence rather than take 
the provocative step of summoning the police, even against destructive protestors 
obviously unconnected with academic life (To Vima, 21 December 2008:a13, Marnys 
Papamathaiou). 
Throughout the following year, with gradually declining frequency, there occurred 
destructive rampages against symbols of wealth by people wearing hooded jackets 
(koukoulofori) and by anarchists. in addition, there were bomb attacks on banks and 
government buildings by tiny terrorist groups. on at least four occasions, police offic-
ers themselves were shot at, sometimes by self-styled revolutionaries, and sometimes 
by common criminals. several were critically wounded by these attacks, and two were 
killed including one who was protecting a witness in the trial of a terrorist. 
The attitude of youth to government
The motives of the youthful demonstrators can be gathered from the assertions of 
some of their spokespeople, and the comments of observers. although initially moti-
vated by fury over the killing, the demonstrators were increasingly motivated in time 
by anger at the entire system of government. in reply to a national poll of 2,123 adults 
in the period 17–23 December 2008, 55% agreed that the demonstrations were “a 
genuine protest against the crisis — political, social, economic — in which our country 
finds itself ” (To Vima, 4 January 2009:a10–11). The motives considered prominent 
(in order of importance) were: fear of unemployment, lack of role models and ideals, 
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problems in the educational system, and the lack of recognition of talent in personal 
and professional development. 
Their anger can be attributed largely to the wretched quality of the state edu-
cational system in which the great majority were enrolled. Public expenditure on 
education had, since at least as early as the 1960s, been extraordinarily low by the 
standards of developed countries; while the participation rate in the higher tiers of 
the educational system had become comparatively high by international standards 
since their explosive growth from the 1980s onwards. surveys over many years of 
students and schoolchildren showed the majority to be discontented with the qual-
ity of education, and particularly angry with its failure to provide them with good 
jobs. The extraordinarily high proportion — generally accepted as the highest in the 
world — of students who were enrolled in foreign universities and studying abroad, 
has for many years, been proof of the thirst for education in Greece, and the low 
opinion that Greeks hold of their higher education system. 
Campaigns by youth, and by the left-wing parties, for greater expenditure on 
public education were a perennial feature of Greek politics. They had, for many years, 
formed part of the “unrelenting struggle” against a conservative establishment, led 
by the first George Papandreou, in the early 1960s. The problem of unemployment 
among graduates of tertiary and secondary education was not unique to Greece. it 
existed also in italy, spain and France; but in Greece it was especially severe because 
there was no unemployment benefit for first-time job seekers, and the level of benefit 
for the rest of the unemployed was extremely low. 
successive reports and commentaries on the educational system at school and 
university level condemned its reliance on rote learning, and its failure to allow ini-
tiative by the teachers or participation by the students (Dafermos in economides 
and Monastiriotis, eds: 10). The degree of ministerial control over secondary and 
tertiary education was extraordinarily far-reaching, and was generally agreed to be 
too subject to partisan influence and changing ministerial decisions. The pressure on 
schoolchildren of rote-learning and examinations was clearly excessive, and enough 
in itself to explain frequent outbreaks of protest. oppressive authority, inefficiently 
exercised, was guaranteed to breed revolt by the young. 
There were further reasons for the chronic restiveness of the young. Political par-
ties were active and influential among students, and to a certain extent, even among 
schoolchildren. The tradition of 17 november 1973 — when troops under orders 
from a dictatorship stormed the Polytechnic institute while occupied by students — 
sanctified student rebellion. 17 november, soon afterwards, became the Bastille Day 
of modern Greek democracy, and became such as a result of student initiative. 
some recent developments had strengthened the cynicism and anger of youth. 
The government aroused fears that it would restrict access to higher education, 
particularly by introducing the requirement, in 2006, that students attain at least 
50% in the national and government-run examinations for entrance to university. in 
December 2008, the government was preparing to recognise the degrees granted by 
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private colleges affiliated to foreign universities, so arousing fears that Greek tertiary 
education would be still further neglected. schoolchildren and students had, in the 
previous three years, repeatedly protested against the government’s reforms by mass 
occupations of educational institutions and street demonstrations. They acquired 
sophisticated skills in organising such protests on a national scale, skills which they 
demonstrated in December 2008. one example was the coordination of attacks on 
about 45 police stations all over the country (Gavriilides in economides and Mona-
stiriotis, eds: 15).
The likelihood that unemployment would increase as a result of the global finan-
cial crisis (which had started in the united states a year earlier) heightened young 
people’s anxiety about their job prospects. The prospect of recession was especially 
provocative because it followed thirteen years of strong economic growth (1995–2008) 
and rising economic expectations. even during this period, Greek attitudes to the state 
of the economy (as revealed by successive eurobarometer polls) were characterised 
by a remarkably high level of pessimism and insecurity, which can be attributed to 
persistently high inflation and unemployment, and the persistently high government 
budget deficit and public debt. This was accompanied by a chronic and worsening 
crisis of the social security funds on which most of the population depended for 
health insurance and pensions. 
The global financial crisis made militant anti-capitalist groups more assertive, 
and readier to take advantage of student protests. Because it had continued, since 
2004, the profligate habits of its predecessors, the new Democracy government 
denied itself now the option of spending to combat looming recession. instead, 
it found itself under irresistible pressure from other eurozone governments to cut 
expenditure, and accordingly had, in november, introduced an unpopular auster-
ity budget, which worsened the prevalent gloom (To Vima, 30 november 2008:a6, 
Dimitra Kroustalli). 
although it is often said that growing social inequality during the long period 
of prosperity fuelled youth anger, there seems to be no evidence that inequality had 
grown. The academic economist, George Pagoulatos, contradicts himself on this 
point (economides and Monastiriotis, eds: 47). There is however much evidence 
that it had for a long time been high by the standards of western europe. Moreover, 
the Greek public was keenly aware of this fact. The recent increase in affluence was 
provocative to the large white-collar proletariat — the so-called “700 euro” genera-
tion, referring to their monthly income — produced by the educational system. These 
people were especially angered by the belief that personal connections and political 
influence had an excessive influence on graduates’ job prospects (Zeri in economides 
and Monastiriotis, eds: 71). 
as in other countries afflicted by the global financial crisis, the public became 
more readily angered by political corruption. at least three cases of government 
corruption had been very much in the news in recent months. Their relevance is 
illustrated by the report that a teenager had been seen kicking the wheel of a garbage 
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truck shouting “Take that, ephraim!”1 before setting it alight with a petrol bomb 
(Kathimerini, 5 June 2009, Paschos Mandravelis).
The traditional abuse of appointments to the public administration for purposes 
of political patronage was so serious that it resulted in a generally low level of gov-
ernmental efficiency. This provoked a chronic crisis of confidence in government, 
which tended over time to intensify as the obligations of government to provide a 
decent educational, health and welfare system increased. inefficient government also 
weakened the country’s economic competitiveness in various ways. Recent opinion 
polls showed extraordinarily high levels — the highest or almost the highest among 
the 27 european union countries — of concern about corruption, and cynicism about 
many political institutions — especially political parties, the police, judiciary, health 
and educational systems (Special Eurobarometer, 291, april 2008; Standard Euroba-
rometer, 69, spring 2008; To Vima, 4 January 2009:a6–7, Dimitra Kroustalli, summary 
of opinion polls about public attitudes in 2008). These feelings were accompanied, as 
already mentioned, by economic anxiety. among young people worried about their 
job prospects, this mixture of attitudes was of course explosive. 
The party in power, new Democracy, must bear special responsibility for pro-
voking this cynicism. it had come to power in March 2004 with a resounding and 
often-repeated promise to “reinvent the state” — meaning specifically, to purge it of 
corruption, free it from party control, and improve its efficiency. These were indeed 
urgently necessary tasks. Yet on coming to power the party largely ignored them. 
instead, it devoted itself with much energy to the very clientelistic practices that it had 
been condemning, so as to compensate itself for its many years of exclusion from the 
spoils of office (Close, 2009:285–89). The affability and communication skills of the 
prime minister, Kostas Karamanlis made him popular for a long time. however, such 
skills began to lose their appeal as the public became aware of his lethargy. 
in 2008, a series of scandals revealed the government’s abject failure to reinvent 
the state. largely because of its lack of resolve to combat the scandals, the govern-
ment lost its lead in opinion polls, although the main opposition party, PasoK, did 
not inspire confidence either (Athens News, 10 april 2009, John Psaropoulos; Athens 
News, 15 May 2009, George Gilson). 
The weaknesses of the police
ever since 1974, the police had exhibited in extreme form the weakness of the public 
administration. Their sense of commitment to their job of upholding the law was 
notoriously low, and their pay was said to be poor even by public service standards 
(Athens News, 10 april 2009, Kathy Tzilivakis). Korkoneas’ behaviour was sympto-
matic of their lack of training. in its annual report for 2008, the Citizens’ advocate (or 
ombudsman) commented that “abuses by the police of the pretext of public security to 
1 ephraim was the abbot of a monastery implicated in one of the scandals.
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arrest, detain and search people have continued with undiminished frequency” (48). 
on the other hand, attacks on police and on police property had also been common 
and had apparently increased in recent years, especially in exarchia (Athens Plus, 12 
December 2008:4, nikos Konstandaras). 
Meanwhile the timidity which the police had commonly shown in confronting 
violent crowds was due to their lack of support by the public and by politicians. The 
police did not dare take strong action against any but defenceless groups, such as 
immigrants, for fear of condemnation by politicians and the media. Those whom they 
charged with any offence — even an ordinary traffic infringement — might appeal 
with success to some friendly politician for protection (Kathimerini, 7 september 
2009, nikos Konstandaras).
Public respect for and trust in the police had, since 1974, been extraordinarily low 
by international standards. For example, a survey in 2004–05 of 32 countries, which 
asked people how satisfied they were with the response when they reported crimes to 
the police, found Greeks to be the least satisfied (International Victims of Crime Survey, 
2008:32). another recent survey concluded, after careful analysis, that the public saw 
the police as typifying the weaknesses of the public service generally — inefficiency, 
inertia, corruption, political interference, lack of planning or resources — and was 
no longer much influenced by historical memories of police oppression before 1974 
(Βερναδάκης, 2002:309; To Vima, 10 May 2009:a30, K. Chatzidis). The failure of the 
police to protect citizens from common crimes such as theft was prominent among 
the grievances that citizens held against the state. 
Yet public attitudes were ambivalent. improving the efficiency of the police meant 
strengthening its powers and authority, and the latter was not a popular cause — a 
fact which explains politicians’ reluctance to take it up. 
The prevalence of anti-authoritarian views, and their own discredit, deprived the 
police of informants against revolutionary law-breakers, and of the power to protect 
witnesses. even when they possessed evidence of wrongdoing, police were sometimes 
afraid to act. in recent years it was repeatedly alleged by police authorities that their 
officers feared to testify against anarchists guilty of attacks on property or against 
soccer hooligans (Kathimerini, 23 January 2007; Chief of Police, quoted by Mark 
Dragoumis in Athens News, 23 February 2007; Kathimerini, 5 May 2007, complaint 
by Minister of Public order). on some occasions, which were not infrequent, cor-
rupt officers leaked information to criminals or concealed their activities (Athens 
News, 23 February 2007, Mark Dragoumis; To Vima, 21 september 2003:a34, v. G. 
lambropoulos; To Vima, 10 May 2009:a30, K. Ch. Chatzidis). 
another example of the prevalence of anti-authoritarian views was the tolerance, 
by governments and university authorities, of the abuse of university asylum by anar-
chists, who periodically caused serious disruption of universities and damage to their 
property. 
This takes us to the general distrust of and disrespect for authority, which have 
characterised society ever since 1974. at the judicial level, this was illustrated by the 
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reluctance of the judiciary to authorise the use of CCTv cameras for anything except 
traffic control, except under tight restrictions. even traffic cameras were liable to be 
vandalised with impunity (Kathimerini, 11 May 2009). at a popular level, the fate of 
the Pegasus police unit a few years ago is instructive. Formed in order to improve 
control of traffic — something desperately needed — it proved too successful for its 
own good. having soon quadrupled the number of convictions for speeding offences, 
it provoked a revolt by athens taxi drivers which compelled its disbandment (Kathi-
merini, 25 april 2009, citing Professor of Criminology, vassilis Karydis). at the street 
level, distrust of authority was expressed in the noisy and often violent demonstrations 
which frequently obstructed traffic in central athens. in the first half of 2008 — not 
a particularly tumultuous period — they averaged seven-eight each month (Kathi-
merini, 23 august 2008). 
insulting the police was a pastime with a tradition dating to the downfall of the 
dictatorship in 1974. But physical assaults on police, and lawless violence generally, 
seem to have become increasingly frequent in the previous few years. a long-term 
reason seems to have been the greatly increasing circulation of illegal firearms, and 
the increasing rate of common crimes. 
The efficiency and reputation of the Greek police had always depended heavily 
on their political leadership. even more, it seems, than most branches of the pub-
lic service, the police had always been vulnerable to interference by politicians in 
appointments, promotions and transfers, and this weakened their discipline. all 
governments were blamed for this practice. The management of the police by the 
new Democracy government, since it came to power in 2004, seems to have been 
particularly weak and inefficient, and was seen as such even by party supporters in 
2009. The Minister of Public order in May 2007, Byron Polydoras, had descended to 
trading public recriminations with the police officers for whom he was responsible 
(Kathimerini, 5 May 2007; Kathimerini, 6 november 2009, anon; To Vima, 21 June 
2009, a. Ravanos, Greek internet edition).
Rebellion against authority had, ever since 1974, been taken to extremes by a few 
self-styled anarchists, anti-authoritarians and revolutionaries. These, as has been 
noted, were prominent in the December riots. Destructive rampages by anarchists 
had been frequent in recent years, although their frequency had been declining before 
December (To Vima, 14 December 2008:a9, v. G. lambropoulos). 
The most deadly of the revolutionary terrorist groups, the “17th november”, had 
belatedly been crushed by the police, in 2002, after assassinating 23 people since 
December 1975. The revolutionary terrorists in 2009 (those prepared to plant time 
bombs and kill police for a revolutionary cause) were considered to number only a 
handful, although they had managed to recruit from the anarchists. one police esti-
mate put their numbers at only five (Kathimerini, 19 July 2009, anon., Greek internet 
edition). They were being advised by veterans, according to the police specialists in 
counter-terrorism who saw a direct line of continuity in personnel, ideas and methods 
between the terrorists of the 1970s and those of 2009. They were nevertheless more 
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amateurish in their methods, indiscriminate in their choice of targets, and cruder 
in ideology than former terrorists (Kathimerini, 30 october 2009, stavros lygeros, 
english edition). 
The flavour of their ideas is conveyed by slogans painted on a bombed bank in 
February: “Their wealth is our blood” and “The bank robs you lawfully...” or a public 
statement the same month “We don’t do politics. We do guerrilla warfare” (To Vima, 
21 June 2009:a6, v. G. lambropoulos; Athens News, 19 June 2009, anon.). The older 
terrorist ideology from which these notions derived was in itself a crude and old-
fashioned form of Marxism, which saw naTo and the eu as instruments of western 
capitalism, and the Greek police as agents of the Greek ruling classes. 
These attitudes had been found in western europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
for example, in the Red Brigades in italy. But they had almost died out except in 
Greece. according to a survey of 2002, 22% of the Greek public sympathised with 
these views, although very few sympathised with terrorist methods (Athens News, 6 
september 2002, Derek Gatopoulos). The views had, in recent years, been stimulated 
by the international reaction against global capitalism, which grew still further after 
the financial disasters in the united states, in 2007–08. 
The other reasons for the survival of these views in Greece seem to have been var-
ied: the general strength of anti-authoritarian sentiment since 1974; the acceptance by 
the major parties of an unpopular alliance with the united states through membership 
of naTo; and the failure of the Greek state to provide an effective welfare safety net 
which might mitigate the effects of social inequality. anti-authoritarian views were 
expressed with particular strength by the far left minor party sYRiZa and by the left 
wing of PasoK, which viewed anarchist violence with ambivalence or even tolerance 
(Zeri, in economides & Monastiriotis, eds: 70; Kathimerini, 3 october 2002). This 
feeling prevented governments from adopting the tough police measures which had 
proved effective in Germany and italy. 
having been in opposition since 2004, PasoK was free to join the parties further 
left in exploiting popular suspicion of the police against a new Democracy govern-
ment. This powerful alignment makes it seem doubtful whether any new Democ-
racy government could lead the police successfully against left-wing violence. so 
it was a blessing for the advocates of law and order that PasoK returned to power 
in october 2009, whereupon the most successful police minister of recent times, 
Michalis Chrysochoïdes — who had presided over the dissolution of “17 november” 
in 2002 — returned to his old job with zeal to reassert police authority.
Conclusion
in December 2008, even before the riots began, the prevalent public attitude to the 
political and economic system was characterised by cynicism, pessimism and a great 
deal of anger. These feelings can be attributed to the extreme weakness of the Greek 
state, and in particular its educational, police and welfare services. The ultimate causes 
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of this weakness can, in turn, be found in the prevalent assumption of the political 
system, that its overriding obligation was to provide abundant, unskilled yet secure jobs 
on a scale which eclipsed the obligations to provide skilled services and to maintain 
financial solvency. 
The grievances caused by the inefficiencies of the public service had, in the previ-
ous thirteen years, been softened by prosperity. But this prosperity had always been 
accompanied by a widespread resentment of various forms of social inequality, and 
by a widespread sense of economic insecurity. By December 2008, this prosperity 
was obviously ending; and the young seemed especially likely to suffer as a result. 
Their mood was consequently inflammable and was ignited by the killing of alexis 
Grigoropoulos.
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